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This paper examines key dimensions of human resource management (HRM) in 
Mozambique, and similarities with HRM practice in its former colonial power, 
Portugal. In particular, we consider institutional path dependence, and how far 
the post-colonial nation has followed a different trajectory from its previous colo-
nial master (Horwitz, Kamoche, & Chew, 2002). These issues assume particular 
theoretical salience, given the process of institutional change in many developed 
ABSTRACT
This is a study of institutional change and continuity, 
comparing the trajectories followed by Mozambique and 
its formal colonial power Portugal in HRM, based on two 
surveys of firm level practices. The colonial power sought to 
extend the institutions of the metropole in the closing years 
of its rule, and despite all the adjustments and shocks that 
have accompanied Mozambique’s post-independence years, 
the country continues to retain institutional features and 
associated practices from the past. This suggests that there 
is a post-colonial impact on human resource management. 
The implications for HRM theory are that ambitious attempts 
at institutional substitution may have less dramatic effects 
than is commonly assumed. Indeed, we encountered 
remarkable similarities between the two countries in HRM 
practices, implying that features of supposedly fluid or less 
mature institutional frameworks (whether in Africa or the 
Mediterranean world) may be sustained for protracted periods 
of time, pressures to reform notwithstanding. This highlights 
the complexities of continuities which transcend formal rules; 
as post-colonial theories alert us, informal conventions and 
embedded discourse may result in the persistence of informal 
power and subordination, despite political and legal changes.
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countries. Institutional approaches to comparative HRM suggest that both formal 
institutions (such as regulatory and economic systems and the roles of employ-
ment-related bodies such as the role of trade unions and collective bargaining) and 
informal institutions (embedded shared understandings of desirable ways of doing 
things) impact on, and are moulded by, firm-level practices. If path dependence 
means that the ex-colonial country maintains many of the features and practices 
of its colonial past, attempts at changing institutions may have less dramatic effects 
than is commonly assumed. Whilst recent theoretical work on Africa’s economic 
progress suggests that colonial powers in contexts of large European settlements 
devoted more care to building better institutions that proved durable following 
independence (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012), Mozambique, despite a very large 
settler community, suffered both economic collapse and instability in the early 
years of independence. We explore the reasons behind this from a firm-centred 
perspective, and drawing on post-colonial theory, explore why changes in formal 
regulation had only a limited effect on actual workplace practices.
The broad literature on comparative HRM evaluates the linkages between national 
contexts and predominant modes of people management, and seeks to compare these 
between settings (Brewster, Mayrhofer, & Morley, 2004). Initially, the main focus 
was on the advanced societies, but by the early 2000s, there was a growing interest in 
emerging markets. HRM in Africa remains relatively under-researched (Ellis, Nyuur, 
& Debrah, 2015; Kamoche, Debrah, Horwitz, & Muuka, 2004; Wood & Brewster, 
2007; see also Horwitz & Budhwar, 2015). There is a very little research on HRM in 
Mozambique (Dibben, 2010; Dibben & Nadin, 2011; Sartorius, Merino, & Carmichael, 
2012), and more generally, there remains a paucity of empirical comparative analysis 
and longitudinal studies of past and contemporary HRM and employment relations 
between former colonial regimes and their independent state offspring. This paper 
adds to the limited body of research by comparing employment relations and HRM 
in Mozambique with the former colonial power, Portugal. It also seeks to  supplement 
existing cultural approaches (see Jackson, 2015), with a stronger focus on long  historical 
processes. Comparisons between the analysis of the ex-colonial power and its former 
territory could shed significant light on present HRM and employment  relations 
systems. The paper also engages with socio-economic  institutional approaches to the 
analysis of work and employment in emerging economies (see, for example, Dibben 
& Williams, 2012; Wood, Dibben, Stride, & Webster, 2010; Wood & Frynas, 2006). 
Through examining employment relations in a colonial power (Portugal) and in its 
former colony (Mozambique), it seeks to understand the valence of arguments that 
point towards enduring colonial legacies vs. those that indicate the effects of the dis-
tinct differences in context. In doing so, it links post-colonial studies to comparative 
HRM and employment relations, and develops a deeper understanding of institutional 
analysis through its examination of an emerging economy.
The paper proceeds as follows: we first examine general issues of post-colonial-
ism, formative institutional legacies, and Africa’s economic performance, focusing 
on work and employment in Portugal and Mozambique. We then use this lens 
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to compare the two countries and develop hypotheses, explaining how we have 
used two separate surveys to test these hypotheses. We present the findings, and 
then in the discussion and concluding section of the paper examine the contri-
bution to post-colonial theory and comparative HRM and the implications for 
institutional theory.
Post-colonialism
Post-colonial studies are often dated from Said’s (1978/1985) volume. However, 
post-colonialism has changed its meaning over time from a strictly temporal one 
to a ‘fighting’ one (Lazarus, 2004, p. 4). Said’s (1978/1985) fundamental point was 
essentially that a ‘scientific’ discourse has emerged involving a set of values and 
assumptions about the role of Western countries and their colonial territories that 
is based on assumptions, many of which are probably wrong. Modern post-co-
lonialism tends to be more nuanced, critiquing both imperialist and nationalist 
narratives (Rao, 2012). The process of neo-colonialism is arguably now not carried 
out by the former imperial states, but mainly by their multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) and the international organizations that work to ensure free trade (Petras 
& Veltmeyer, 2001). Having ‘finally’ emerged in management and organization 
studies (Jack, Westwood, Srinivas, & Sardar, 2011, p. 275), post-colonialism has 
been used to explain the markets of MNEs (Banerjee, Chio, & Mir, 2009) and the 
way in which organizations are structured and operate (Prasad, 2012). However, 
there are few studies of HRM in post-colonial societies that address this con-
tested theory (McLeod, 2007) and even fewer that address the legacy of colonial 
institutions on HRM.
Most post-colonial studies focus on the discourse used to ensure the contin-
ued domination of the colonial masters, but there have been calls to take greater 
account of materialist formulations (Mir & Mir, 2009; Murphy & Zhu, 2012), an 
approach that we adopt here, in linking institutional and post-colonial theories. 
We acknowledge that the process of transferring knowledge across national bor-
ders is itself imbued with colonialism (Frenkel & Shenhav, 2006), but we try to 
set our analysis within the political–economic framework of colonialism and its 
aftermath (Jack et al., 2011). Whilst engaging with post-colonial debates, we use 
comparative survey evidence to shed new light on the nature of long-term continu-
ities in workplace practice, formative institutional legacies and institutional design.
Institutions and Africa’s economic performance
Within the comparative institutional literature, there has been growing interest 
in seeking to explain the uneven and relatively poor and volatile performance of 
many African economies (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Robinson, 2002; Wood & 
Horwitz, 2015). In an influential account, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue 
that the relative fortunes of African nations can be traced back to the colonial era, 
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and differences in colonial policy. In countries unsuitable for significant European 
settlement, there was a focus on constructing exploitative institutions, designed to 
extract wealth for the benefit of the colonial power. In countries with significant 
European settlements, more attention was accorded to promoting the rule of law, 
and replicating the institutional arrangements of the home country, providing a 
more stable basis for continuity and growth after independence.
Portugal was the poorest of the European colonial powers in Africa, but in last-
ing for more than 500 years, Portuguese colonialism in Africa endured far longer 
than that of any other major colonial power – Britain, for example, ruled most of its 
African colonies for less than a century. In late colonial era Mozambique, there was 
a very sizable European settlement, and attempts to extend the institutions of the 
metropole to the colony. Despite this, the country experienced much political and 
economic instability in the two decades after independence, making the country 
an important exception to this rule; the reasons for this are explored in this paper.
Institutions, work and employment in Portugal
The early literature on comparative capitalisms assumed that markets would grad-
ually move to one or other of the liberal/coordinated market models, because 
of their greater efficiencies and complementarities (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Later 
accounts recognized that Mediterranean or mixed-market economies represented 
an archetype in their own right and that, despite apparent institutional changes, 
they continued to follow distinct trajectories (Amable, 2003; Hancké, Rhodes, & 
Thatcher, 2007), characterized by divisions between a historically statist sector 
(the public sector, state-owned enterprises and large private firms with close ties 
to the state) and a poorly regulated SME and informal sector. They had weaker 
and less closely coupled institutions than the more mature archetypes (Amable, 
2003). Portugal has a history of institutional layering, whereby new institutional 
arrangements do not totally substitute for old ones (Rocha & Araujo, 2007), and 
rigid hierarchies and procedurality are accompanied by modernization (Tavares 
& Alves, 2006, p. 584). Continuities include the relative importance of agriculture, 
a large SME sector (Karamessini, 2008), and a relatively large informal economy, 
whilst informal networks facilitate the bypassing of formal institutional arrange-
ments (Aguiar, 2005).
From 1933, authoritarian corporatist rule under Salazar’s Estado Novo built on 
the Portuguese legal tradition and patriarchal dimensions of Portuguese culture 
(Aguiar, 2005). In the 1960s, the state moved towards greater integration with the 
European economy and, in its closing years, there were cautious moves towards 
liberalization (Nunes, Mata, & Valério, 1989). The economy internationalized, with 
a significant influx of foreign capital and further industrialization (Holman, 2001, 
p. 59). However, high infantile mortality, low educational levels and an inefficient 
agricultural sector remained, notwithstanding the large gold reserves that were 
accumulated during this period (Blakanoff, 1996).
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In 1986, Portugal joined the European Union (EU), and the Portuguese 
Government initiated a process of liberalization and privatization, which would 
turn the country into one of the three largest privatizing countries in the Western 
world (Cunha & Cooper, 2002). The boom in Portuguese industry from the 1980s 
until the early 1990s was followed by a gradual decline in the face of European 
competition (Karamessini, 2008), and Portugal was marked by rising income ine-
qualities (da Silva Lopes, 2003). Meanwhile, the family continued to play a central 
role in many Portuguese firms, with corresponding patriarchal, authoritarian and 
gendered divisions of labour and the persistence of family-based welfare and infor-
mal systems of HRM (Karamessini, 2008). Portugal became committed to ever 
greater labour market flexibility which built on a tradition of poor enforcement 
of labour law, with light oversight of small firms and often weak and ineffective 
workplace representation (Karamessini, 2008).
Considerable dispute and labour turmoil followed the fall of the Estado Novo 
(da Silva Lopes, 2003; Karamessini, 2008). This was ameliorated through tripar-
tite dialogue, initiated in 1985. Under tripartite arrangements, the government, 
employers’ confederations and trade union confederations formed part of the 
Permanent Committee of Social dialogue whose main role was to promote social 
dialogue on public employment policies, vocational training, social security, tax 
and public administration or fixing the amount of the minimum monthly wage. 
Thematic task forces, composed by the social partners, analysed relevant issues 
from a technical point of view before their final assessment. This process eventu-
ally led to a series of pacts surrounding collective bargaining, health and safety 
and vocational training and frequent government interventions, particularly in 
terms of minimum wages and guidelines for wage increases (Cardoso, 2006), 
but the state remained ineffective in enforcing emerging labour standards in the 
large informal sector.
Institutional legacies, work and employment relations in Mozambique
The Portuguese arrived in Mozambique in 1498. Most of the 500 years of 
Portuguese rule were characterized by high levels of exploitation of resources 
similar to those in West Africa, but the closing years of colonial rule were also asso-
ciated with the large-scale transfer of people from the metropole (Hanlon, 1991). 
The exploitative nature of early Portuguese rule reflected the underdeveloped 
nature of Portugal itself. Early Portuguese colonial rule was mostly exercised via 
the prazos, concessionaires acting as feudal warlords (Newitt, 1969) and, in rural 
areas, peasants were subject to indirect rule via appointed regulos or chiefs. This 
period did not result in serious institution building beyond extending the state’s 
monopoly over the use of armed force, and slowly modernizing administration 
within the cities. By the twentieth century, a large portion of Mozambique was 
administered by the ‘majestatic companies’, created because the Portuguese state 
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lacked the necessary human, financial and administrative resources to administer 
the colony directly. A coercive labour system was employed (Carvalho, 2012).
In 1961, the Estado Novo responded to growing pressures for decolonization by 
adopting a policy of integration, bolstered by greater investment in the colonies, 
more migration from the metropolitan homeland, and active efforts to develop 
industry (Henriksen, 1978). The late 1960s saw significant increases in inward 
foreign investment and industrialization, associated with Portuguese economic 
development plans (Planos de Fomento) for the colonies and the increased impor-
tance of the services sector (Fleshman, 2009; Francisco, 2003). Elements of the 
authoritarian corporatism of Portugal penetrated Mozambique, encompassing 
both employer interests and the white-dominated trade union branches of the 
Portuguese unions. However, late Portuguese colonialism failed to incorporate 
the African majority economically (Munslow, 1984). One consequence was the 
emergence of Frelimo, a political and military liberation movement that opposed 
the colonial and the capitalist system (Francisco, 2003).
Colonial era authoritarian corporatism was abandoned on independence in 
1975. Frelimo formed the first post-independence government and embraced state 
socialism (Hanlon, 1996; Munslow, 1984). The racial elites lost their privileges 
and fled. Most enterprises and land holdings were placed under state ownership. 
However, private SMEs and entrepreneurs remained. In 1976, an armed rebel 
movement, Renamo, sponsored by white minority governments in South Africa 
and what is now Zimbabwe, emerged, and the country descended into a protracted 
civil war. In 1994, a political settlement led to Mozambique’s first democratic elec-
tions, which were won by Frelimo. Yet, the government was forced to turn to the 
World Bank and the IMF and, again on a broadly similar timescale to Portugal, 
implemented sweeping neo-liberal reforms (Brück, 1998). In HRM terms, this 
contributed towards large-scale job losses (Dibben, 2010); whilst democratiza-
tion meant more autonomy for trade unions, job losses resulted in a collapse in 
membership (Dibben, 2010). A new tripartite negotiating forum, the Consultative 
Labour Commission, set a minimum wage, but enforcement of agreements was 
uneven or weak (Webster, Wood, & Brookes, 2006). Throughout all these changes, 
there were strong continuities in Mozambican work and employment relations, 
with divisions between larger firms (often either currently or previously state 
owned), SMEs, and a very large informal sector, with a legacy of authoritarian 
management (Dibben & Nadin, 2011; Webster & Wood, 2005; Wood et al., 2010).
Methods
As outlined in the introduction, through examining employment relations in a 
colonial power (Portugal) and in its former colony (Mozambique), the key research 
problem tackled by this paper is how to understand the validity of arguments that 
point towards enduring colonial legacies vs. those that indicate the effects of the 
distinct differences in context.
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Hypothesis development
In the context of these two countries’ economic and institutional histories, to what 
extent are work practices in Mozambique likely to be similar to those in Portugal? 
Both Mozambique and Portugal experienced turbulent decades but had relative 
political and social stability, and well-developed labour legislation. Informal net-
works of support played an important role in the SME sector, given the failures of 
formal institutions and difficulties in gaining access to capital. In addition, both 
countries have a history of patriarchal authority systems at the workplace, a residue 
of a specific form of industrialization. However, there also appear to be a number 
of marked differences. Mozambique’s primary institutional legacies have been 
extractive, in contrast to the uneven, but more modern, institutional tradition of 
Portugal. Hence, despite late colonial institutional building, including extending 
the coverage of mother country legislation into the colony, and the importance of 
informal networks and conventions, there are likely to be persistent differences in 
institutional capabilities, with the Mozambican environment being more precari-
ous for both firms and workers. Both countries have undergone major neo-liberal 
reforms, but these were more intense in Mozambique. Given these differences, and 
in particular, the more precarious state of the Mozambican economy and weaker 
institutional coverage, job security is likely to be more fragile than in Portugal.
Hypothesis 1a: Whilst the incidence of redundancies is likely to be relatively high in 
both contexts, they will be significantly higher in Mozambique.
Hypothesis 1b: The proportion of the workforce on non-permanent contracts will be 
high in both countries, but relatively higher in Mozambique.
Owing to common institutional legacies and shortfalls, both countries have expe-
rienced persistent skills gaps. The commitment of firms to training and develop-
ment can be evidenced by its formality or informality (Goergen, Brewster, Wood, 
& Wilkinson, 2012). However, the lower capabilities of Mozambican organizations 
and the precarious nature of their competitiveness is likely to mean that training 
and development will be less developed than in Portugal.
Hypothesis 2: Informal workplace-based forms of training will be used in both coun-
tries, but will be more common in Mozambique than Portugal.
Given the importance of informal networks and obligations in both contexts, it 
is likely that informal methods of recruitment will be common in both cases but, 
given infrastructural limitations and general institutional weaknesses, their use 
might be more pronounced in Mozambique.
Hypothesis 3: The use of informal methods of recruitment will be more common in 
Mozambique than Portugal.
Collective voice mechanisms can involve participation by workers and their 
collectives in the re-negotiation of the employment contract, and in the setting of 
work relations including financial participation and communicative mechanisms 
(Marchington, 2005; Whitley, 1999, p. 39). Unionization and collective bargaining 
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in both countries are likely to be strongly concentrated in larger firms but, given 
that Mozambique represents a more extreme case of organizational segmentation 
and incomplete institutional coverage, its use will be more pronounced in that 
country.
Hypothesis 4: Collective bargaining and unionization are likely to be concentrated 
in large firms in both the countries under review, but more so in Mozambique than 
Portugal.
Other employee voice mechanisms may be weak in both contexts. However, 
the tradition of patriarchal managerialism might suggest that general meetings, 
whereby managers inform workers of organizational developments in their own 
terms may be the most common communication device (Webster & Wood, 2005). 
Again, it could be argued that their use will be more pronounced in Mozambique 
than Portugal.
Hypothesis 5: Workforce meetings represent the principle form of communication in 
both contexts, but their use is more common in Mozambique than Portugal.
Although performance-related pay may be viewed as a component of hardline 
approaches to HRM (Gollan, Poutsma, & Veersma, 2006), in the developing world 
many organizations will simply opt for paying the lowest rate that the external 
labour market will bear. In such circumstances, piece work, a simple form of 
performance related pay, represents an alternative. However, it is possible that 
firms which opt to pay the bare minimum, reining in shirking through close 
surveillance, may still seize short-term competitive advantages.
Hypothesis 6: Performance related pay is used by a larger proportion of firms in 
Portugal than in Mozambique.
Data and samples
The data used for the empirical analysis within this paper come from two sources. 
For Mozambique, the data come from a survey of firms carried out in 2003, 
the sampling frame being compiled from the official telephone directory. The 
survey instrument was broadly based on the more established Cranet survey 
(see below), but shortened and adapted in order to focus on issues and concerns 
that might be present in a developing country context. In total, 177 firms were 
surveyed. Stratified sampling was employed, strata being defined by geographic 
locale and, within each geographic locale, by sector. This ensured representa-
tion of both key areas of industrial concentration and sector. The survey covered 
greater Maputo and greater Beira, the two principal industrial and commercial 
centres in Mozambique. For Portugal, the data employed in this paper are from 
the repeating Cranet survey which collects evidence on HRM issues of private 
and public organizations (Brewster et al., 2004). Given that the Mozambican sur-
vey aimed to broadly replicate a selection of the themes covered in the Cranet 
survey, this comparison is considered to be valid. The data-set used in this paper 
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contains results from the 1999–2000 survey (a relatively close wave of the Cranet 
data to the 2003 Mozambique survey, and well in advance of the 2008 economic 
crisis) which is broadly representative with respect to the industrial sector in each 
individual country. Mozambique has gone through a number of quite dramatic, 
transitions, from colonial rule to state socialism, civil war and political uncer-
tainty, to democratization and neo-liberalism. At the time that the survey was 
conducted, the latter changes had been bedded down and have persisted to this 
present day. As this study is on continuity in institutions and HR practice, despite 
external shocks, this makes the findings of the surveys still relevant; indeed, it 
could be argued that Mozambique’s somewhat smoother progress since then (see, 
for example, World Bank Group, 2012), means that are there fewer pressures on 
firms to fundamentally change – or at least question – what they do. Information 
was collected from a postal survey of the senior HRM practitioner in organizations 
with more than 100 employees. Hence, the data available were from 177 firms in 
Mozambique and 169 firms in Portugal. Once listwise deletion was undertaken 
for the key variables in the empirical model, this was reduced to a working sample 
of 300 firms, with 157 in Portugal and 143 in Mozambique.
Methods of analysis
Although the data-sets are different and the questionnaires used in each country 
were not the same there are broad areas of consistency across the two. In terms of 
the formal hypotheses, there were relevant direct questions in both surveys. For 
example, all firms were asked if they had made use of compulsory and voluntary 
redundancies in the last three years and whether temporary or fixed-term con-
tracts were used. They were also asked directly whether they made use of word 
of mouth to recruit as well as whether they used informal work-based training, 
thus enabling the construction of binary variables. The only exception was the 
coverage of percentages of trade union membership, which was measured as a 
continuous variable.
In order to test whether significant differences were present across the two 
countries, as stated in the hypotheses, it was important to distinguish between 
inter-country differences and those differences which resulted from factors below 
the country level, such as organizational size or the industry in which the organ-
ization operated. Therefore, empirical models were estimated. The key factors 
such as size, sector and industry were included as control variables (Porter, 1980; 
Hall & Weiss, 1967).
The variables representing each of the dimensions outlined in the hypotheses 
above were used as the dependent variable of a model. In addition, the variables 
were estimated as a function of size of organization, sector and type of indus-
try. For trade union membership, the model was estimated using ordinary least 
squares and was of the form:
Y
i
= 훼 + 훽�x
i
+ u
i
,
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with yi being the dependent variable, α the intercept term, ui a normally dis-
tributed error term, xi the vector of explanatory variables and β′ their estimated 
coefficients. In situations where the dependent variable was binary, a logit model 
was used such that:
where Pi is the probability that the dependent variable equals 1, 1  −  Pi is the 
probability of it being zero and Li is the log of the odds ratio. Since the log of the 
odds ratio was linear in the parameters, the logit model could be estimated in the 
linear form (Gujarati, 1995, pp. 554–556). When the various OLS and logit models 
had been estimated they were then re-estimated separately for the two different 
countries to enable testing of the stated hypotheses. For the OLS models, we used 
a version of the Chow test, where
and RSS is the residual sum of squares from the pooled model, the Portugal model 
and the Mozambique model, respectively, n1 is the number of observations from 
the Portuguese sub-sample and n2 the same from the Mozambique sub-sample, 
finally k is the number of parameters. The F statistic followed an F distribution 
with degrees of freedom (k, n1 + n2 − 2k) (Gujarati, 1995, pp. 262–264).
For the logit models, we used a likelihood ratio test of the form:
where LR is the likelihood ratio and LL is the maximization of the log-likelihood 
function from the Portuguese, Mozambique and pooled models, respectively. LR 
followed a chi-squared distribution with k degrees of freedom, where k was the 
number of estimated parameters (Greene, 2000, pp. 825–826). Both the OLS and 
logit models had the null hypothesis that the structure of the two sub-sample 
models was the same, i.e. for a given size, sector and industry Portuguese organi-
zations tended to be the same as those in Mozambique in terms of that particular 
dimension.
Findings
Table 1 records the mean values by country for each of the key dimensions used 
in the analysis. For example, 51% of the organizations in Portugal had made use 
L
i
= ln
(
P
i
1 − P
i
)
= 훼 + 훽�x
i
+ u
i
F statistic =
(
RSSPooled −RSSPortugal −RSSMozambique
)
∕k
(RSSPortugal +RSSMozambique)∕
(
n1 + n2 − 2k
)
LR = 2
(
LLPortugal + LLMozambique − LLPooled
)
THE InTERnATIonAl JouRnAl of HuMAn REsouRCE MAnAGEMEnT  2529
of voluntary redundancies in the previous three years compared to only 12% of 
those in Mozambique.
Considering these figures in the context of the hypotheses enables an under-
standing of how the findings can be interpreted, at least at an observational level. 
The data enabled a separation between voluntary and compulsory redundancies 
and although more firms in Mozambique had made use of compulsory redun-
dancies, around four times as many Portuguese firms had used voluntary redun-
dancies. Therefore, the overall use was considerably higher in Portugal. Hence, 
Hypothesis 1a is rejected.
Hypothesis 1b is also not supported. However, our measures are fairly blunt 
since the question only asked if the organization made use of temporary or 
fixed-term contracts; the respondent was not asked about the proportion of staff 
employed under these contracts. Clearly, this issue is of potential interest and 
would be an obvious target for future research.
Informal work-based training and informal recruitment were both more com-
mon in Mozambique than in Portugal. For both informal training and informal 
recruitment the test null can be rejected, for the former at the 1% level and the 
latter at the 5% level. Although the levels of confidence differ, it is fairly safe to 
conclude that Hypotheses 2 and 3 can therefore both be accepted.
Hypothesis 4 was that collective bargaining and unionization was likely to be 
concentrated in larger firms in both the countries under review, but more so in 
Mozambique than Portugal. Collective bargaining was higher in Portugal, and 
union membership higher in Mozambique. However, the hypothesis posited a 
relationship between level (of collective bargaining and membership) and firm 
size (higher levels in larger firms). In fact, in the regression results upon which 
the structural tests are based, the size variable was not significant in any of the 
models. Therefore, although we can be fairly confident that there are significant 
differences within these dimensions across the two countries these are not influ-
enced by firm size. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is rejected.
Hypothesis 5 was that workforce meetings represented the principal form of 
communication in both contexts, but their use was more common in Mozambique 
than Portugal. The analysis showed that the use of workforce meetings was 
Table 1. Key dimensions – mean values by country.
Variable Portugal Mozambique
Voluntary redundancies 0.509 0.124
compulsory redundancies 0.059 0.113
non-permanent contracts 0.911 0.085
Informal training 0.29 0.689
Informal recruitment 0.118 0.373
collective bargaining 0.858 0.503
union membership 33.50% 37.93%
Workforce meetings 0.815 0.209
Performance-related pay 0.586 0.622
observations 157 143
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considerably higher in Portugal. We cannot tell whether such meetings were the 
organization’s major communication channel with its employees.
Finally Hypothesis 6 posited that performance related pay was used by a larger 
proportion of firms in Portugal than in Mozambique. In fact, it was used by a 
higher proportion of firms in Mozambique, although only marginally. Hypothesis 
6 is rejected.
To understand more clearly whether the hypotheses outlined earlier can be 
accepted or rejected, we need to go beyond these observational level data to the 
structural tests described above. Table 2 reports the outcomes from carrying out 
these tests. In the interest of space and brevity, in addition to reflecting the fact that 
the explanatory variables were used as controls only (with no formal hypotheses 
related to them), the regression and logit results are not reported here, although 
they are available from the authors on request.
Table 2 reports, for each of the dependent variables, the number of parameters 
in the model which established the degrees of freedom for the resultant test. It 
also reports the critical values at the 5 and 1% levels. In most cases, these values 
are based on the chi-squared distribution, the only exception being union mem-
bership where, because it is a continuous variable and an OLS regression was 
estimated, the critical values are based on an F (16,268) distribution. In each case, 
the null hypothesis was that there were no significant differences for that variable 
between Portugal and Mozambique. In order to accept the hypotheses outlined 
in this paper, the estimated statistic from the models needs to be higher than the 
critical value, and the null of the structural test rejected.
In summary, for hypothesis 1a, we cannot reject the test null for differences 
in compulsory redundancies, but we can for voluntary redundancy. So overall, 
hypothesis 1a is rejected. For hypothesis 1b (differences in the use of non-perma-
nent contracts), the null test was strongly rejected, so hypothesis 1b is accepted. 
For informal training and informal recruitment, in both cases the null test can 
be rejected, for the former at the 1% level and the latter at the 5% level. Although 
the levels of confidence differ it is fairly safe to conclude that hypotheses 2 and 3 
can both be accepted. Hypothesis 4 relates to the coverage of collective bargain-
ing and the extent of union membership. Although in both cases the test null is 
rejected, both are more likely in larger firms. However, in the regression results 
Table 2. structural test outcomes.
Variable Parameters Critical value 5% Critical value 1% statistic null
Voluntary redundancies 16 26.29 31.99 58.24 reject at 1%
compulsory redundancies 16 26.29 31.99 15 accept
non-permanent contracts 16 26.29 31.99 221.74 reject at 1%
Informal training 16 26.29 31.99 50.68 reject at 1%
Informal recruitment 16 26.29 31.99 27.94 reject at 5%
collective bargaining 16 26.29 31.99 27.04 reject at 5%
union membership 16 1.68 2.07 2.07 reject at 1%
Workforce meetings 16 26.29 31.99 94.38 reject at 1%
Performance-related pay 16 26.29 31.99 21.06 accept
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upon which the structural tests are based, the size variable was not significant 
in any of the models. Therefore, although we can be fairly confident that there 
were significant differences within these dimensions across the two countries 
these were not influenced by firm size. Therefore, hypothesis 4 is rejected. Finally, 
both hypotheses 5 and 6 can be rejected. With the former, although the test null is 
rejected, workforce meetings were actually more commonplace in Portugal. With 
regard to Hypothesis 6, the hypothesis is rejected since there were no significant 
differences in the probability of organizations using performance related pay in 
each of the two countries.
Discussion and conclusions: the limitations of institutional 
embeddedness
In terms of HR practices and employment relations our results have shown that 
there were both similarities and differences between the two countries. In both 
countries under review, firms were similarly likely to make use of redundancies. 
At the time of the surveys, both economies had undergone long transitions to 
marketization, associated with previously large organizations shedding substan-
tial amounts of labour which, in turn, had been unevenly mopped up by smaller 
firms and, particularly in Mozambique, by the informal sector. In Portugal, the 
major privatization programme in the 1990s led to corporate restructuring and 
downsizing, with workforce reduction primarily through voluntary redundancies, 
enabling a relatively peaceful labour relations climate (Cunha, 2000). Although we 
found a significant difference between the two countries in the relative propen-
sity to make use of temporary labour, this was not on the lines predicted. Labour 
legislation is widely disregarded by many smaller and medium-sized employers 
in both countries, but state capabilities in Mozambique are weaker and, hence, 
enforcement less likely. If it is easy to shed labour, then the temporary contracts 
offer relatively limited advantages to employers, perhaps explaining why they were 
less commonly utilized in Mozambique than Portugal.
With regard to the differences in recruitment, training and communication, 
informality is greater in Mozambique. With regard to training, in Mozambique 
at the time of independence, 93% of the population was illiterate. Although great 
strides were made in the first years of independence, progress ground to a halt 
owing to the civil war (UNESCO, 2000). The radical structural adjustment policies 
in the 1990s further damaged state provision of education and technical training 
(Hanlon, 1996). These circumstances meant that firms were particularly likely 
to fall back on informal training. Informal recruitment methods were also more 
common in Mozambique, which might again reflect limitations in literacy and 
infrastructural weaknesses, or might be due to the operation of extended informal 
networks of support that interpenetrate many African countries (Hyden, 1983), 
and/ or the stronger emphasis on communitarian ties (c.f. Sartorius et al., 2012).
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An area where both countries had common ground was in relation to collective 
bargaining, which was concentrated amongst larger employers. Whilst this would 
be true of almost all economies, this segmentation appears to be particularly 
pronounced in the two countries under review, compared to firms in mature 
economies. This emphasizes the more marginal nature, and weaker capabilities, 
of medium and smaller firms operating in such contexts.
Whilst firms made greater use of informal ‘on the job’ approaches in 
Mozambique, in both countries there was an extensive reliance on general work-
force meetings. Such forms of verbal, top-down, communication highlight limita-
tions in employee voice: employees expressing views unpopular with management 
in such forums could open themselves to victimization. It also reflects a common 
culture of informality in managing people in both contexts.
The use of performance-related pay was similarly present in both countries, but 
such systems can be very diverse, ranging from sophisticated approaches to the 
use of piecework. However, in contexts where employment relations are widely 
individualistic, state enforcement of the law uneven and employee countervailing 
power weak, it can be argued that many firms simply default to paying the bare 
minimum that the market will bear.
Our evidence would have been stronger with more closely matched samples and 
with larger numbers of respondents. Despite these limitations, we believe that our 
findings are clear: in key areas, there are fewer differences than expected in people 
management and employment relations between Portugal and Mozambique, in 
contrast to other research using the Cranet survey which has found considerable 
differences between countries (see, for example, Goergen et al., 2012).
Our findings contribute to literature on post-colonialism, since they suggest 
that there are abiding institutional legacies from colonialism. As post-colonial 
theory alerts us, existing power relations and associated patterns of behaviour 
may be embedded and replicated through a process of discourse that transcends 
formal structures; this further explains the durable influence of colonial era infor-
mal conventions and norms, despite the wholesale departure of colonizers and 
the ideological bankruptcy of the colonial Portuguese state. Whilst looking to 
state socialist economic models, the post-independence Mozambican creole elite 
retained close cultural – and, indeed, at times, familial ties – to the metropole, 
making the resumption of trade and investment relations between Portugal and 
Mozambique in the 1990s smoother and facilitating the return of significant num-
bers of former settlers. This imparted not only continuity in managerial practice, 
but also promoted the revitalization of specific ways of doing things, even if this 
made workers no better or worse off. In other words, the persistence of aspects of 
colonial era formal and informal regulation and associated firm-level behaviour 
cannot be explained solely through an analysis of formal institutions.
At the same time, there were some limitations to the durability of institu-
tions. In this respect, this study contributes to debates on the long-term influ-
ence of colonial level institutional arrangements on the fundamental fortunes 
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of nations. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) suggest that in countries with large 
settler populations, colonial authorities devoted more time to institution building 
and, more specifically, directly replicating the institutional arrangements of the 
metropole. They further suggest that this would result in greater political sta-
bility, societal coherence and economic progress (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; 
Wood & Horwitz, 2015). Yet Mozambique showed limited economic progress 
in the years after independence. The limitations in the durability of institutions 
may be accounted for by three possible, but not mutually exclusive explanations. 
The first is that Portugal’s experiment at institution building under the Estado 
Novo was different to that adopted by other colonial powers since it was more 
centralized, with the aim of extending parent country institutions to draw in the 
colonies as provinces, rather than replicating them, as was the case, for example, 
with the British East and Southern African colonies in the late colonial period. 
Therefore, embedded rules lacked centralized bureaucratic support. Secondly, 
Portugal itself represented a relatively underdeveloped country with not wholly 
functional institutional arrangements; extending them abroad would not neces-
sarily provide a sound foundation for growth. Thirdly, independence led to the 
exit of skilled colonialists, which challenged training institutions, leading to a 
greater emphasis on improvisation and the informal dissemination of skills. All 
of this suggests that institutional substitution or replication does not necessarily 
provide an adequate foundation for effective HRM, or, indeed, for firms to succeed 
in the same manner as in the metropole. Proponents of the liberal market model 
and associated firm-level practices – based around numerical and pay flexibility 
– might therefore do well to consider the range of challenges associated with the 
dissemination of a particular model of rules and practices into a very different 
context. More generally, a feature of liberalizing economies is that firms compete 
increasingly on cost grounds, with a tendency towards low value-added work and 
employment policies, processes that are particularly pronounced in peripheral 
countries (Tickell & Peck, 1992, p. 355). Although the economic crisis that began 
in 2008 has changed things since then, at the beginning of the decade pressures 
towards the adoption of neo-liberal policies in Portugal were limited by accession 
to, and membership of, the EU (Haworth & Hughes, 2003, p. 670). Hence, the 
consequences of Portugal’s semi-peripheral geographic locale were ameliorated. At 
the same time, Mozambique’s peripheralization has been accentuated. It is possible 
that the more recent scale of neo-liberal reforms in Portugal, in response to the 
economic crisis, may result in greater similarities with Mozambique.
Clearly, despite great differences in some areas, we found much common 
ground between these two geographically distant countries, external shocks and 
neo-liberal reforms notwithstanding. In terms of these findings’ relevance for 
institutional theory, on the one hand, it could be argued that the common ground 
reflects abiding institutional legacies, with the modernization of institutions and 
economic life that took place in late colonial Mozambique leading to convergence 
with the key dimensions of the Portuguese model. As Pitcher (2002) notes, key 
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features of Mozambican governance and society proved quite resilient despite 
independence, civil war and later neo-liberal reforms; it is as yet uncertain as to 
whether the 2008 economic crisis will have similarly limited effects on Portuguese 
institutions, although initial evidence suggests that marketization has, once more, 
gone hand-in-hand with structural continuities (Carneiro, Portugal, & Varejão, 
2014). On the other hand, our findings may reflect practices that are relatively 
common amongst a broad range of firms operating within evolving institutional 
contexts. Hall and Soskice (2001) suggested that effective complementarities 
are likely to be concentrated within mature liberal and coordinated markets; 
other types of capitalism may be associated with less effective regulation and 
fewer advanced and mutually supporting intra-organization practices, leading 
to strong pressures of convergence to one or other of the two fully developed 
capitalist archetypes (Hancké et al., 2007). Later work has sought to identify a 
greater range of capitalist archetypes, including the ‘segmented business systems’ 
in Africa (Wood & Frynas, 2006) and ‘informally dominated market economies’ 
(Dibben & Williams, 2012). These archetypes are characterized by segmentation 
between larger organizations and their more weakly regulated smaller and medi-
um-sized counterparts, ongoing (sometimes radical) liberalization, uneven state 
enforcement capabilities and shortfalls in needed skills and capabilities. Rather 
than adding to an already extensive list of possible varieties of capitalism, future 
research might aim to provide a more integrated taxonomy of fluid and partially 
mature institutional contexts. This would recognize that contexts cannot be dis-
missed as universally dysfunctional and note that their distinctive features may 
be sustained for protracted periods of time (rather than converging with one or 
other of the two mature varieties of capitalism). Operating within such contexts 
may be associated with relatively durable practices which, whilst sometimes low 
value added, may continue to confer advantages specific to the context in which 
they are encountered, even if simply in terms of imparting greater resilience in 
coping with external shocks.
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